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The Internationalization of Chilean
Agriculture: Implications of the United
States-Chile Free Trade Agreement
Lindsay M. Fain6*
INTRODUCTION
The United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement (U.S.-Chile
FTA) has finally arisen from the negotiation table. Countries
have been waiting in line to finalize free trade agreements with
the heralded country of the south. While many Chileans have
been enjoying the benefits of the fast-growing economy, others
have taken to the streets to protest against Chile's internation-
alization and the crisis they believe is just around the corner.
This crisis is the expression of a continuous imbalance between
rural agriculture and the agricultural export market, and be-
tween agricultural economic growth and human-oriented rural
development.1 Peasant farmers, campesinos, face increasing dif-
ficulties in remaining competitive, and the working conditions of
rural wage laborers continue to be precarious.2 Although pov-
erty has decreased significantly since the return to democracy in
1990, the gap between the rich and poor continues to be pro-
nounced.3
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2002, Drake Uni-
versity. I would like to thank my husband, Jos6 A. Fain6 Fuentealba and my friend,
Rodrigo Aburto Ortiz for their Chilean expertise as well as my editors Sung Y. Lee
and Kyle Wermerskirchen for their support and advice.
1. See generally David E. Hojman, Introduction, in NEO-LIBERAL
AGRICULTURE IN RURAL CHILE (David E. Hojman ed., 1990) (discussing the dramatic
changes in Chilean agriculture and rural society since the 1973 military coup).
2. Id.
3. MICHAEL DUQUETTE, BUILDING NEW DEMOCRACIES: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
REFORM IN BRAZIL, CHILE, AND MEXICO 187 (1999).
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Chile's neoliberal policies trace back to the fall of Salvador
Allende.4 Before this period, Chile was a relatively closed econ-
omy where agriculture contributed less than five percent to
Chile's overall exports.5 By the 1990s, Chile had become one of
the most open economies in the world in which agriculture gen-
erated about thirty percent of overall exports. 6 Chile has at-
tempted to make this transition under a 'growth with equity'
development strategy.7 However, the government has failed to
tackle the negative social consequences of market liberalization
on the rural countryside, where campesinos derive their liveli-
hood from grain, wheat flour, sugar, and edible vegetable oil
("traditional agriculture").8 Instead, the government has fur-
thered Chile's deep integration into world markets through free
trade agreements. 9 However, the resolution of the agrarian
question in Chile cannot be left to free market forces alone.
Rather, the state must actively intervene to mitigate the effects
of trade liberalization on the rural population.10 The state
needs to facilitate local initiatives to spread the benefits of
growth and modernization, especially to those marginalized dur-
ing the authoritarian rule from 1973 to 1989.11 Although Chile's
increased market access offers great opportunities for growth,
this also exacerbates inequality and dependency. 12
This Note seeks to understand Chile's trade liberalization
policy as it relates to agriculture. Part I of this Note introduces
the basics of free trade analysis and the effects of protectionist
4. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
5. See Patricio Silva, State Subsidiarity in the Chilean Countryside, in NEO-
LIBERAL AGRICULTURE IN RURAL CHILE 2 (David E. Hojman ed. 1990).
6. Id.
7. See Rafael X. Zahralddin-Aravena, Chile and Singapore: The Individual
and the Collective, A Comparison, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 739, 739-41 (1998);
Crist6bal Kay, The Agrarian Policy of the Aylwin Government: Continuity or
Change?, in CHANGE IN THE CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE 27 (David E. Hojman ed., 1993)
[hereinafter CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE]. The discourse in the new government was
reconciliation and commitment to a social market economy. See id.
8. CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 7, at 27.
9. See generally Mark P. Sullivan, Chile: Political and Economic Conditions
and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress (Aug. 5,
2003), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23586.pdf (discussing
the background for the Chile-United States FTA).
10. See generally, ALAN WINTERS, TRADE AND POVERTY: IS THERE A
CONNECTION?, (World Trade Organization Working Paper), at www.wto.org/english/
newse/press00_e/pov3_e.pdf (June 13, 2000).
11. See infra Part II.
12. RICARDO FRENCH-DAVIS, REFORMING THE REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA 2
(2000).
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measures on trade. Part II provides a historical background of
Chile's economic and agricultural reform and summarizes
Chile's agricultural economy and the safeguards Chile has im-
posed to protect that economy. Part III describes Chile's free
trade agreement with the United States and its likely effect on
Chile's agricultural economy. Part IV analyzes the potential ef-
fects of the U.S.-Chile FTA on Chilean agriculture. Part V sug-
gests strategies to reposition the theme of "Human Develop-
ment" as a fundamental proposition for the coming years, using
market liberalization as a resource to achieve it, and not as an
obstacle for sustainable development. This Note concludes that
Chile, as a model country of trade liberalization, must take posi-
tive steps to support traditional agriculturists throughout the
transition in order to promote human development on a world-
wide level.
I. FREE TRADE BASICS
Economists analyze trade liberalization by considering both
short and long-term effects as well as weighing the social and
private costs of adjustment. 13 Long-term effects are the most
important for successful free trade agreements.' 4 The most im-
portant long-term gains include increased competition, stimulus
to investment and more efficient use of economic resources.' 5
The short-term effects of creating a free trade agreement are
measured in terms of trade creation and trade diversion.' 6
Trade creation occurs when lower-cost imports from one trading
partner replace domestic production from the other.17 The idea
is that trade creation causes efficiency gains for each country
13. WINTERS, supra note 10, at 59. "Trade liberalization is generally held to
have long-run benefits, but it more or less requires adjustment in a country's output
bundle to achieve them. If adjustment is costly, liberalization could lead to periods
of decline and/or poverty before things get better." Id.
14. Id. at 58-59.
15. See id.
16. Dr. Richard L. Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements and the Establish-
ment of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 945, 949
(1996) (describing how regional trade agreements can discriminate against non-
members).
17. The theory of comparative advantage says that a country will export the
product in which it has the greater advantage, and import the commodity in which
its advantage is less. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 8 (1995). For example, if the United States can produce
wheat more cheaply than Chile, the United States will have a comparative advan-
tage in wheat and therefore will export the wheat to Chile. Id. at 9.
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because each country will shift from a higher-cost domestic
source product to a lower-cost foreign product.18 Each country
will eventually begin to specialize in producing those items in
which they have a comparative advantage. 19 Trade diversion
occurs when lower-cost imports from a third party are prevented
from entering a signatory country because of tariffs20 or non-
tariff barriers, 21 and are replaced by higher-cost imports from a
signatory country.22 Economists argue that protectionist meas-
ures are the leading cause of trade diversion. 23
Protectionism in agriculture has been pervasive. 24 The in-
stability of the agricultural market forced all countries to con-
sider agriculture as an exception to trade liberalization. 25 Coun-
tries invoked quantitative restrictions,26 export subsidies, 27 and
domestic subsidies 28 in order to protect their domestic agricul-
tural sector from the fluctuation in the international market. 29
While many international trade agreements have sought to re-
duce protectionist measures in favor of free trade, countries
have been slow in removing such restrictions. 30
Proponents of protectionist measures argue that the agri-
cultural sector should be treated differently because of self-
sufficiency, exceptional price instability, and preservation of the
rural way of life.31 Moreover, smaller countries are unable to
subsidize their farmers to the same extent as larger, industrial-
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. A tariff is a tax imposed at the border on imported goods. Id. at 373.
21. There are hundreds of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), such as quotas, subsidies,
quality standards, and health and safety regulations. Id. at 378.
22. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 130 (1999).
23. See generally, JACKSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 372-435 (discussing the
effects of tariffs, quotas, and NTBs).
24. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 22, at 246. "Protectionism has been per-
vasive in the agricultural sector in Canada, the United States, the EU and Japan."
Id.
25. Id.
26. A quantitative restriction, or quota, is the most commonly used NTB.
JACKSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 376. "A quota specifies the quantity of a specific
product that a country will allow to be imported during a specific time period." Id.
27. "The export subsidy... is paid to an industry only on products that are ex-
ported." Id. at 758.
28. "The domestic subsidy is granted to an industry on all of its production of a
product, regardless of whether that product is exported." Id. at 757.
29. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 22, at 246-51.
30. Id. at 246.
31. Id. at 252-254.
386 [Vol. 13:2
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ized countries. 32 The basic argument against agricultural pro-
tection is that it distorts the functioning of free trade.3 3 Critics
argue that it misallocates resources by shifting resources toward
less efficient producers who are favored by protectionist meas-
ures and away from producers that are more efficient.34 On a
domestic level, the argument follows that protectionist meas-
ures lead to higher-cost imports, thereby forcing domestic con-
sumers to pay a higher price for their products. 35
II. THE CHILEAN EXPERIMENT
A. THE AGRARIAN REFORM - FROM SOCIALISM TO DICTATORSHIP
TO DEMOCRACY
When Salvador Allende became president of Chile in 1970,
he faced an unstable situation in the country. 36 In the country-
side, there were constant clashes between campesinos and large
32. For example, the United States introduced the 2002 Farm Bill that in-
creases support to United States farmers by $190 billion over the next ten years.
See The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116
Stat. 134 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); 2002 Farm Bill
Regulations-Marketing Assistance Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments for Pea-
nuts, Pulse Crops, Wheat, Feed Grains, Soy Beans, and other Oil Seeds, 67 Fed Reg.
63506 (Oct. 11, 2002) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 1421). Smaller countries, like
Chile, do not have the budget to support all farmers to that extent. See Eduardo
Olivares & Luis Mendoza, Parte TLC y Proyectan Aumento de 10% en Exportaciones
a EE.UU. en 2004 [Free Trade Agreement Projects 10% Increase in Exports to the
United States in 2004], LA TERCERA, Jan. 2, 2004, at 20.
33. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 22, at 254 (stating that the fundamental
issue is whether any of the reasons in favor of trade protection necessitate measures
that radically distort world trade and cost non-farm households thousands of dollars
in both higher food prices and in taxes that pay for farm subsidies).
34. Id.
35. Id. The author discusses the possibility of stabilizing farmer's incomes di-
rectly, through income averaging techniques or income insurance, rather than forc-
ing consumers to pay higher prices. Id. But see John S. Markle, Slaying the Sacred
Cow: Looking for Consensus in the Reformation of World Agriculture Trade, 68 N.D.
L. REV. 607, 619-620 (1992) (arguing that while direct income is economically wise,
it may be politically impossible). The author argues that direct income support con-
verts cheap government programs into an expensive support system for farmers. Id.
36. PAMELA CONSTABLE & ARTURO VALENZUELA, A NATION OF ENEMIES: CHILE
UNDER PINOCHET (W.W. Norton & Company 1991). In 1970, Salvador Allende, a So-
cialist Senator, overcame the Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei with a thirty-six
percent plurality. Id. at 23. "Unfazed by his slim mandate and lack of majority
support in the Congress, he launched ambitious plans to nationalize copper mines,
take over factories and banks, accelerate land reform, and raise living standards.
He was convinced that the sluggish, inefficient economy could be stimulated without
leading to inflation." Id. at 24.
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landowners.37 Allende recognized the existence of class conflict
and advocated for the exercise of state power on behalf of the
weaker class. 38 By 1973, the government had expropriated over
4000 farms and the large land estates had ceased to exist. 39
This reform promoted unionization of the rural campesinos.40
However, on September 11, 1973, General Augusto Pinochet
Ugarte launched a coup d'etat against the Allende administra-
tion. 41 This day marked the beginning of seventeen years of dic-
tatorship, a critical turning point for Chile's financial market
and social and political unrest.42
While other Latin American countries were suffering the
same political upheaval, 43 General Pinochet began a major pro-
ject of trade liberalization one year after announcing himself
President of Chile.44 At the same time, the United States was
campaigning against communism and socialism, 45 thereby giv-
ing the Pinochet administration the additional strength needed
37. Id. at 24-25.
38. See Harry P. Diaz, Proletarianisation and Marginality: The Modernisation
of Chilean Agriculture, in NEO-LIBERAL AGRICULTURE IN RURAL CHILE 132 (David E.
Hojman ed., 1990) (describing the military's first step to reverse the process of Al-
lende's agrarian reform by ending expropriations and redistributing expropriated
land to various groups, including the former owners).
39. WILLIAM C. THIESENHUSEN, BROKEN PROMISES: AGRARIAN REFORM AND
THE LATIN AMERICAN CAMPESINO 103-04 (1995) (stating that Allende expropriated
as many farms in his first year as the previous President did in his entire six-year
term).
40. See infra notes 73-76 and. accompanying text.
41. Hojman, supra note 1, at 1 (describing the 1973 military coup as the mark
of dramatic change for Chilean agriculture and rural society).
42. See generally CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 36 for a vivid descrip-
tion of Pinochet's dictatorship.
43. Id. Almost every country in Latin America experienced a military takeover
during the 1970s and 1980s. Id.
44. DEMETRIS PAPAGEORGIOU ET AL., LIBERALIZING FOREIGN TRADE:
ARGENTINA, CHILE, AND URUGUAY 177 (1991).
However, unlike many countries in similar circumstances, Chile went on to
mount a major and most ambitious project of trade liberalization between
1974 and 1979, which unified exchange rates, eliminated import prohibi-
tions, export quotas, all tariff exemptions, and on-tariff barriers, and re-
duced a tariff schedule widely dispersed around an average of 90 percent to
a flat 10 percent.
Id.
45. CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 36, at 22-39. Upon Allende taking
office, the United States mounted a "two-track operation" to rid Chile of socialist
rule: "while diplomats waged an overt political crusade, the CIA spent up to one mil-
lion dollars on propaganda and other operations aimed at creating financial and po-
litical panic." Id. at 23.
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to promote a pure free-market model. 46 The United States took
advantage of this opportunity and sent young economic theorists
to Chile to experiment with the growing economy. 47 These stu-
dents, commonly known as the "Chicago Boys", arrived in Chile
hoping to stabilize the distorted exchange rates and to standard-
ize the varying rates on numerous products.48
The trade liberalization project proved successful in many
respects, with the gradual elimination of protectionist measures
in favor of more liberal policies.49 Nevertheless, the 1980s saw
stagnation in the forward-moving Chilean economy as well as
for all of Latin America. 50 Consequently, the United States
transitioned their economic focus to Eastern Asia, where fast-
growing markets were more appetizing than the struggling
markets in Latin America. 5 1 In reaction to Chile's slow market,
the Chilean administration implemented measures to protect
their domestic agriculture by increasing tariffs.52
Fortunately, the stagnation of the 1980s did not defeat
Chile. In 1989, the dictatorship ended, and a democratically
elected government took office in 1990.53 "Neoliberalism with a
human face" has characterized the economic policy since the
46. See id. at 168.
47. PHILIP KING, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
POLICY 191 (2000) ("Chile con Chicago" is perhaps the best known, and extreme, ex-
ample, where the University of Chicago virtually adopted the Catholic University of
Santiago as a training ground for future Chilean economists. What these techno-
crats began in the 1980s has largely changed the face of the economic policy envi-
ronment of the emerging markets in this last decade.").
48. CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 36, at 168-71. These economic
theorists sought to experiment with the free-market principle, sharply in contrast to
the Marxist theory for underdevelopment that prevailed at the time. Id. at 168.
49. PAPAGEORGIOU, supra note 44, at 177-79. See also, Hojman, supra note 1,
at 1 ('The land reforms carried out during the 1960s and early 1970s were reversed
and some expropriated estates returned to their previous owners.").
50. CARMEN ZECHNER, EXPANDING NAFTA: ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON CHILE OF
FREE TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES 12 (2002) ('The 1980s have been labeled the
lost decade for Latin America. The term 'lost decade' refers to the stagnation and
decline of real GDP (gross domestic product) and per capita income recorded in Latin
America during the 1980s.").
51. Id.
52. See Diaz, supra note 38, at 132 (stating that in reaction to the economic cri-
sis, Chile increased tariffs and incorporated more pragmatism in subsequent neolib-
eral policies); See discussion infra pp. 17-22 regarding the Chilean price band sys-
tem. The government set up a state fund to finance the minimum support prices for
some key products and the government established a few technical assistance pro-
grams for those campesinos considered viable. The aim was to bring about an in-
crease in yields so as to make the traditional farm sector more competitive.
THIESENHUSEN, supra note 39.
53. See CONSTABLE & VALENZUELA, supra note 36, at 296-320.
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democratic transition. 54 The new administration continued to
promote the neoliberal 55 model but attempted to implement bet-
ter social policies. 56 Nevertheless, the administration still em-
phasized greater market liberalization with a focus on agricul-
tural exports and failed to undertake any substantial social
initiatives that might be favorable to the rural campesinos.57
Moreover, the country used its new democratically elected gov-
ernment and its unique geographical location to regain the in-
terest of the Northern Hemisphere. 58
In the search to amplify its exportation markets, Chile has
been very committed to the subscription of trade agreements. 59
Chile's active and open trade policy has led to economic agree-
ments with all the Andean countries in 1995,60 to membership
in MERCOSUR in 1996,61 and to free trade agreements with
Canada in 1997, Mexico in 1998, and both the European Union
and Central America in 2002.62 These trade agreements gave
rise to a seven percent increase in Chile's gross domestic prod-
uct annually.63 This dramatic increase and Chile's new ap-
54. CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 7.
55. Neoliberal is a term often used in Latin America to describe a variation of
the capitalist, free market policy. See DUQUETTE, supra note 3, at 125.
56. Id. The government encouraged cooperative forms of organization among
smallholders of property in order to obtain credit, marketing, and technical assis-
tance. Id.
57. Id. (describing the new government's fear of launching any fundamental
policy proposals that might resurrect the Allende years).
58. ANDRES BIANCHI, TOWARDS A CHILE-UNITED STATES FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT (2002), available at http://www.chileusafta.com/press-newsindiv.html?
news id=3cc471041c210744_7201 ("Due to its openness and relatively small size,
Chile is linked more directly than many other countries to economic developments
around the world. However, rather than view this fact with fear, Chile has em-
braced it as an opportunity.").
59. Id.
60. The Andean Pact, which formally changed its name to the Andean Com-
munity in 1997, is made up of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and
Chile. DUQUETTE, supra note 3, at 138 (stating that Chile was part of the Andean
Pact but withdrew in 1976 in order to increase foreign investment).
61. See id. at 166-71. Mercado Comdin del Sur (MERCOSUR) is a free market
zone designed to integrate the economies of the southern cone of Latin America in
order to create increased bargaining power against other trading blocs. Id. When
Chile began negotiating with MERCOSUR, the officials promised that additional
resources would be provided to rural campesinos in order to help protect their liveli.
hood. Id. In addition, measures that protected traditional agriculture were still al-
lowed. Id.
62. BIANCHI, supra note 58. The result of these trade agreements led Chile
from "a net external debtor of nearly $15 billion in 1987 to being a net external
creditor of $8.5 billion in 2001". Id.
63. Id. The Chilean economy suffered in 1999 due to the Asian economic crisis
2. S- CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
proach to market liberalization provoked the United States to
view Chile with respect and as a model for other developing
countries in Latin America.64
B. CAMPESINOS V. GLOBALIZATION: THE PLIGHT OF THE
TRADITIONAL FARMER
Chile has a population of approximately fifteen million and
a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $156 billion.65 Chile is com-
prised of thirteen regions, numbering from I in the north to XII
in the south and Santiago, Chile's capital. 66 The principal agri-
cultural regions are III to X because regions I and II are primar-
ily desert, and XI and XII comprise much of the Patagonian re-
gion.67  The Andes mountain range, the Coastal mountain
range, and the valleys that lie in the center of the country char-
acterize the other eight regions. 68 Chile's total arable land is
2.65% and permanent crops total .42%.69 Thus, only a relatively
small portion of the total land in Chile is suitable for agricul-
tural use.7 0 Wheat, sugar and edible vegetable oils, known as
Chile's traditional agriculture, characterize region VII, while
the regions IV through VI, collectively known as the Central
Valley region, are dedicated primarily to the fruit sector.7 1
but rebounded in 2000. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 4.
64. Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission, Bilateral
Trade Relations-Chile, (Oct. 2002), at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/ bilat-
erallchile/index en.htm. "Chile is widely recognised as having the most open, stable
and liberalised economy in Latin America... It is not for nothing that the World
Economic Forum has rated the Chilean economy as the most competitive in Latin
America." Id. See also HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE,
108TH CONG., STATEMENT ON HOW THE UNITED STATES-CHILE FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT SERVES THE INTERESTS OF UNITED STATES COMMERCE, at http://ways
andmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/chilehr2738docbenefitschileFTA.pdf [hereinafter
HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS] (describing Chile as one of the world's fastest growing
economies and as having a thriving democracy).
65. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACT BOOK (2003), at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ci.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004)





70. Paulina De Los Reyes, The Rural Poor: Survival Strategies and Living
Conditions among the Rural Population in the Seventh Region, in NEO-LIBERAL
AGRICULTURE IN RURAL CHILE 146 (David E. Hojman ed., 1990). "The peasants are
located primarily in areas of low agricultural return, for example, in isolated hilly
areas near the Andes or in dry coastal regions." Id.
71. Id. at 146 (stating that a large share of the rural population resides in re-
gion VII).
20041
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1. Domestic Agricultural Market
Campesinos that dedicate themselves to traditional agricul-
ture "are located in areas of low agricultural return."72 While
many of these traditional agriculturists have suffered from pov-
erty for generations, the marginalization reached under the Pi-
nochet administration was unprecedented. 73 The campesinos
felt the deterioration of production conditions, the reversal of Al-
lende's land reform, and the consequent marginalization of hun-
dreds of thousands of families, high unemployment, and the
substitution of permanent work by seasonal employment. 74
Since the return to democracy, however, campesinos have in-
creased production levels through advanced technologies.7 5
They are no longer defined as a structurally backward or stag-
nant sector. 76 Nonetheless, campesinos continue to suffer from
poverty.7 7 The poverty of today, however, was not created by
the same factors as that of the early 1960s and 1970s. 78 Today,
some argue that the poverty is a result of a neoliberal model
that is unable to integrate most of the rural population into the
market in a meaningful way that could contribute to improved
living conditions.7 9
Chile's tariff system has tried to protect the campesinos by
dissuading foreign countries from trying to export agricultural
products at a rate lower than the campesinos are able to pro-
duce. All agricultural products have a uniform import tariff
that dropped to six percent in 2003 with the exception of se-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 147. Rural campesinos represent the bottom quintile in the Chilean
economy. Id. During the Pinochet administration, the land that had been given to
them by the Frei and Allende governments was taken away and returned to many
large landowners or used by the government to promote international investment.
Id.
74. Id. at 146.
75. Diaz, supra note 38, at 131 (stating that recent agricultural modernization
has been the product of a new style of development imposed by the Pinochet Ad-
ministration). The agricultural modernization consists of the "efficient allocation of
resources through the market, private property and private enterprise." Id.
76. Id. at 127.
77. De Los Reyes, supra note 70, at 146.
78. Diaz, supra note 38, at 127.
79. Id. See James Langman, Free Trade a Dilemma for Chile; Success for Some
Means Loss for Others, WASH. TIMES, (June 17, 2003) (stating that the U.S.-Chile
FTA will mean greater opportunity for some in Chile, such as for the successful ex-
port producers). "But for the more than 200,000 farmers in southern Chile who spe-
cialize in [traditional agricultural products such as] wheat, dairy products, beef and
[sugar] beets produced mainly for the domestic market free trade with the United
States. spells impending disaster." Id.
392 [Vol. 13:2
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lected grains, wheat flour, sugar, and edible vegetable oils.80
These products are protected by a price band system, which is
determined annually with reference to both domestic and inter-
national conditions.8 ' The price band contains a floor price and
a ceiling price.8 2 If a country exports a product to Chile at a
price lower than the floor price, the Chilean government adds a
tariff to raise the price equal to the floor price.8 3 If a country
exports a product at a price higher than the set price ceiling, the
Chilean government will lower the price to equal the ceiling
price.8 4  This policy is designed to shield domestic producers
from fluctuating world prices and to encourage farmers to adopt
better farm management practices.8 5 Proponents of the system
contend that relevant economic, social, and labor reasons cou-
pled with food security justify its functioning.8 6 For over twenty
years, the farmers and their respective industries have counted
on the certainty of a minimum price of production.8 7 Moreover,
yields of some crops increased substantially so that they are
now similar to those achieved by advanced countries with highly
developed and subsidized agriculture, such as the United States
and countries in the European Union.88 On the other hand, crit-
ics argue that the price band is protectionist; it does not guaran-
tee that the associated costs will be equally distributed between
80. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 5.
81. RECOPILACION DE LEYES Y REGLAMENTOS [COMPILATION OF LAWS AND
REGULATIONS] Law No. 18.525 at art. 12 as amended by Law No. 19.897 (Chile),





85. Jaime Campos Quiroga, Las Bandas de Precios, un Mecanismo de Seguri-
dad y Confianza Para los Productores [Price Bands, a Mechanism of Security and
Confidence for Producers], July 1, 2003, available at http://www.agroamigo.cl
/contenido/estadistica/est-banda.htm [hereinafter Security and Confidence] (describ-
ing that for economic, social, labor, strategic and food security reasons the price
band has been justified. For the last twenty years, farmers have been able to pro-
duce with the certainty of receiving a minimum price for their products).
86. Id. See also Hojman, supra note 1, at 4 (stating that the price band has "led
to output increases [and] significant result[s] in terms of local employment trends").
Proponents of price stabilization argue that people in farming is a social good in it-
self. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 22, at 253-54. One assumption is that with-
out family farming, the countryside would be saturated with polluting industries or
replaced by commercial towns. Id. Even urbanites argue that maintaining the
beauty of the countryside is an important social factor that should be considered. Id.
at 254.
87. Id. at 253.
88. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 4.
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the producer and the consumer and it inhibits the Chilean econ-
omy from successful integration in the international market and
therefore affects the development of the export sector.8 9
Many of Chile's trading partners have also condemned the
price band system because they found it to be nontransparent,
unforeseeable, and discretionary. 90 For instance, in 2002, Ar-
gentina filed a case with the World Trade Organization 91
(WTO), claiming that Chile violated its obligations under the
Agreement on Agriculture92 (AoA). Under the AoA, Chile's
bound tariff rate for wheat, wheat flour, and edible vegetable
oils was 31.5%.93 Argentina argued that Chile's price band sys-
tem did not maintain the tariff within this range.94 Argentina
looked to Article 4:295 of the AoA, essentially arguing that the
89. Jaime Gatica, La Banda de Precios del Azdcar [Sugar Price Band], June 19,
2002 at http://www.expansiva.cllcolumnas/detalle/tpl?idcolumna=06192002121731
[hereinafter Sugar Price Band]. See also TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 22, at
254 (asking whether price distortions necessitate measures that increase food prices
and taxes for non-farm households in order to pay for farm subsidies). Critics that
argue against price stabilization through subsidies believe that the income of farm-
ers could be stabilized through income averaging techniques or income insurance.
Id.
90. WTO Appellate Body Report on Price Band System and Safeguard Meas-
ures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products, WT/DS207/AB/R para. 71 (Sept. 23,
2002), at www.wto.org [hereinafter Price Band Panel Report].
91. After World War II, many governments pushed for a multilateral discipline
in international trade in order to compete against the trade protection imposed by
major trading nations. BHARGIRATH LAL DAS, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION: A
GUIDE TO THE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE 3 (1999) (describing the need
to expand international trade in order to ensure development and growth). In 1986,
the Uruguay Round on Multilateral Trade Negotiations began, which resulted in a
comprehensive set of agreements including the Agreement on Agriculture, purport-
ing to eliminate protectionist measures. Id. at 6. In the same process, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) emerged as the administrator on the implementation of
the Uruguay Round agreements and provided a framework for the enforcement of
these rights and obligations. Id. at 3.
92. The Agreement on Agriculture is designed to open up countries' borders to
agricultural products by reducing the import restrictions that countries have main-
tained to protect their agriculture. WTO Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1995,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/14-ag.pdf [hereinafter Agreement on
Agriculture]. The AoA sets out an implementation period for the reduction of agri-
cultural protection for each country, dependent upon their level of development. Id.
LAL DAS, supra note 91, at 240 (showing a typical schedule of a Member and an
analysis of their reduction requirements).
93. Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2002, 20 ARiz. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 143, 221-22 (2003) (discussing Chile's Price Band System which drew the
"ire of Argentina"). The applied most-favored nation rate was only eight percent.
Id. at 222.
94. Price Band Panel Report, supra note 90.
95. Agreement on Agriculture, supra note 92, art. 4:2. Article 4:2 provides that
"[m]embers shall not maintain, resort to, or revert to any measures of the kind
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price band system was similar to a "variable import lev[y] and
[to a] minimum import price", both of which are prohibited. 96
The WTO Panel, agreeing with Argentina, held that the addi-
tional duties that Chile imposed on wheat and edible vegetable
oils violated the AoA.97 The Appellate Body, agreeing in part
with the Panel, gave Chile fourteen months to modify their price
band system. 98
In response to the WTO's decision, Chile undertook to mod-
ify their system of price bands. 99 On August 6, 2003, Chile sup-
plemented Law No. 19.897 with Article 12 of Law No. 18.525,
which went into effect on September 25, 2003.100 The new law
sets a fixed floor value and a fixed ceiling value until 2007.101
From 2008, both the floor and the ceiling will be reduced 1.5%
annually until 2014.102 In the case of sugar, after 2007, the
fixed values will be reduced two percent annually from 2008 un-
til 2011 and then six percent annually from 2012 to 2014.103
Overall, the new law is transparent, foreseeable, and nondiscre-
tionary because exporting countries will be able to determine
the exact tariff that will be placed upon its product.104
2. Agricultural-Export Markets
Chile's fresh fruit exports grew fifteen-fold between 1974
and 1992,105 providing Chile with a comparative advantage in
which have been required to be converted into ordinary customs duties, except as
otherwise provided for in Article 5 and Annex 5." Id. The AoA footnotes different
measures that are included under Article 4, including "quantitative import restric-
tions, variable import levies, minimum import prices, discretionary import licensing,
non-tariff measures maintained through state-trading enterprises, [and] voluntary
export restraints". Id. at n. 1.
96. Price Band Panel Report, supra note 90, para. 73.
97. Id.
98. See id.
99. Amended Band Law, supra note 81.
100. Id.
101. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
102. Id. art. 1, para. 4.
103. Id.
104. See supra note 81.
105. GABRIEL G. CASABURI, DYNAMIC AGROINDUSTRIAL CLUSTERS: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COMPETITIVE SECTORS IN ARGENTINA AND CHILE 32 (1999)
(describing the significant growth in fruit exports pursuant to a strong policy and
business strategy as well as based on favorable natural conditions); see also Manuel
R. Agosin, Free Trade Agreements for Chile: Potential Benefits and Costs, 4
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 25 (1994) (stating that fruit and vegetable
exports to the United States are greater in volume than those to other trading part-
ners).
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trade liberalization. 10 6 The rapid growth has allowed the fruit
industry to take over land that was previously dedicated to tra-
ditional agriculture in the Central Valley. 107 This growth was
encouraged by the generous government subsidies and fiscal in-
centives that mainly benefited large corporations. 108 A few mid-
dle-sized and capitalized small farms also grew rapidly because
of international borrowing. 109 Many regions in the north and
south of Chile also tried to accommodate the needs of the fruit
industry, but the land does not benefit from the privileged
agroecological situation enjoyed by Chile's Central Valley. 110
Unfortunately, Chile's fruit market has not escaped without dif-
ficulties. Due to competition from other nations, the Chilean
fruit industry faces saturation that can only be cured through
greater diversity in both market and product."'
Also included in Chile's agrarian reform was the develop-
ment of the agroindustrial sector. The agroindustry exhibits the
specific traits most associated with recent Chilean economic
success: export growth in a natural-resource related sector.112
106. In 1779, David Ricardo documented the theory of comparative advantage.
MIKE MOORE, A WORLD WITHOUT WALLS: FREEDOM, DEVELOPMENT, FREE TRADE
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 52 (2003). His theory suggested that specialization of a
group, rather than just an individual, was the basis for economic success. Id.
107. CASABURI, supra note 105, at 32-33.
108. Id. at 33-36 (analyzing the reasons why Chile's government subsidized the
fruit market in order to ensure its success). Corporaci6n de Fomento de la Produc-
ci6n (CORFO) designed a plan to promote investment in the fruit sector. Id. at 35-
36. The plan studied the foreign markets to determine the public demands in the
fruit sector while building the basic infrastructure for developing the industry. Id at
36. CORFO also provided credit to those farmers and facilities that chose to grow
and export the types of fruit that the study had determined to be the most profitable.
Id.
109. THIESENHUSEN, supra note 39, at 111. The large growth created many jobs
in agriculture but the rural peasants did not benefit from the increased agricultural
activity. Id. at 112.
110. CASABURI, supra note 105, at 31. The Central Valley surrounds Santiago,
Chile's capital, which is home to nearly six million people. Id. at 33-34. This loca-
tion provides the fruit industry with reduced transportation costs, access to the hub
of economic activity in Chile and rich soil. Id. at 31-34. Moreover, "the relative
physical isolation of the Valley ... means that it benefits from the lack of wide-
spread plant diseases that affect competing fruit-production regions." Id. at 31.
111. Id. at 38 (noting that countries such as South Africa and Argentina are re-
establishing themselves and trying to recover market shares that were lost to Chile
in previous years). See also CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE, supra note 7, at 28 (describing
the need to open up new export markets because Chilean fruit was reaching its
limit).
112. THIESENHUSEN, supra note 39, at 112 ("This sustained agro-export growth
is the success story of the neo-liberal economic strategy and has garnered wide-
spread admiration for the Chilean policy model.").
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The agroindustrial hotbed is located in the northern central re-
gion of Chile, 113 near the Central Valley. Networks of small pro-
ducers who supply to large firms producing fruit, vegetables,
wine, and dairy products for local and export markets character-
ize the sector. 114 Forty-three percent of Chilean agriculture goes
to the agroindustrial sector, thereby having a major effect on the
structure and conduct of farming.11 5 While just thirty years ago
this sector did not export, state intervention helped the agroin-
dustrial sector achieve twenty percent of total processed natural
resource-related exports. 1 6 Nonetheless, this sector also exhib-
its the same dwindling presence of smaller agroindustrial firms
as is prevalent in the export of primary agricultural products.1 17
Between 1975 and 1995, investment in smaller agroindustrial
firms decreased while many larger firms showed double-digit
annual growth in investments. 18 For example, Chile's largest
agroindustrial firm, IANSA, produced sugar from sugar beets
grown by small and medium farmers for thirty-five years." 9
However, in 1985, the company privatized and moved largely
into the export of tomato paste. 120 IANSA's change in emphasis
largely affected the sugar beet producers in the south because of
the number of contracts being formed with medium and large
fruit farmers. 121
113. XIMENA MILICEVIC ET AL., LINKAGE IMPACTS OF FARMING WITH
AGROINDUSTRIAL CONTRACTS: THE CASE OF TOMATOES IN CHILE, 3 (May 1999),
available at www.rlc.fao.org/prior/desrural/pdf/milicevl.pdf (stating that the agroin-
dustry began mainly with the grapes, sugar beets, and apples but expanded to in-
clude other fruit and vegetables by the 1990s).
114. Paola Perez-Alemin, Learning, Adjustment and Economic Development:
Transforming Firms, The State and Associations in Chile, 28 WORLD DEV. 41, 42
(2000) (describing the new dynamic between private firms and the government in
order to encourage new standards of product quality and upgrade productive capa-
bilities).
115. MILICEVIC ET AL., supra note 113, at 1 (stating that approximately twenty-
five percent of farmers in Chile have contracts with agroindustrial firms). "[T]his
implies that up to now the center of gravity of agroindustry are the medium-not
the smaller farms." Id.
116. Id.
117. Martine Dirven, Local Agroindustry Survival Difficulties in a Globalizing
World, Illustrated by Examples from the Chilean Milk Industry (Aug. 2, 1999), at
http://www.redcapa.org/Downloads/mdirven2.doc ('The number of small agroindus-
trial firms fell from 1,381 in 1980, to 1065 in 1990, to 1005 in 1995 while the number
of larger agroindustrial firms increased steadily from 318, to 445, to 505.").
118. Id.
119. MILICEVIC ETAL., supra note 113, at 3.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 10-11. See Agriculture Online, Chile's Iansa Plans Layoffs in Re-
structuring, (Oct. 6, 2003) at http://www.agriculture.comlworldwide (stating that
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III. BILATERAL FREE TRADE AND AGRICULTURE
International indicators show that Chile has an open, com-
petitive, transparent and disciplined economy. 122 The economic
stability, political transparency, and the relative ease of doing
business in Chile highlights the institutional stability, the legal
certainty for investors, the quality of the political economy, and
a solid financial system; factors consistent with the macroeco-
nomic rigor needed to compete in the world market.123 All of
these factors reflect the low risk that a country confronts when
dealing with Chile's economy, despite the recessive interna-
tional scene, the drought in external financial sources, and with
the economic crisis of its neighbors. 124 The national indicators
explain why Chile is able to negotiate free trade agreements
with both the United States and the European Union simulta-
neously. 125 Chile believes that both negotiations have come at a
decisive moment to deepen their export sector, and through this,
promote investment, employment and modernization of their
productive system. 126
The U.S.-Chile FTA, signed on June 6, 2003,127 culminates
negotiations that began in 1990.128 Prior to the late 1990s, the
United States was highly competitive in the Chilean market.129
Subsequently, Chile became a party to numerous free trade
Chilean sugar producer IANSA has begun a restructuring program that includes
reducing its workforce by fifteen percent to increase the company's productivity and
competitiveness). "The corporate reshuffle is part of a plan to raise sugar production
to 100 tons per year from the current 76 tons by 2014 when a price band that pro-
tects local sugar producers from cheaper imports will be removed." Id.
122. Evgenia V. Sorokina, Chile's Free Trade Agreements: Can Their Benefits
Survive Chile's Continuing Controls On Foreign Capital, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1217, 1219 (2003) (describing Chile as the most attractive emerging market in South
America because of economic stability, political transparency, and relative ease of
doing business).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1218-19.
125. Id. at 1218.
126. Id. at 1218-19 (describing the Chilean government's hopes to reverse the
economic slowdown by signing agreements with the European Union and the United
States). Skeptics of the U.S.-Chile FTA suggest that the benefits may be exagger-
ated unless Chile can reduce their costs of production because of high shipment costs
from Chile to the European Union or the United States. Id. at 1231-1232.
127. Trade Agreement, June 6, 2003, U.S.-Chile, 42 I.L.M. 1026, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/fta/Chile/final.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Chile FTA].
128. Agreement Concerning a United States-Chile Council on Trade and In-
vestment, Oct. 1, 1990, U.S.-Chile, 29 I.L.M. 1404. The preamble refers to the U.S.
Enterprise for the Americas Initiative and the intention to establish a mechanism
for encouraging free trade. Id. at 1405.
129. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS, supra note 64, at 1.
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agreements, providing preferential market access for its new
partners. 130 From 1989 until 2000, the United States ran a
small trade surplus with Chile but exports fell drastically be-
tween 2001 and 2002. This, in turn, left the United States with
an approximate deficit of U.S. $1.2 billion.'3 1
Chapter three of the U.S.-Chile FTA deals with agricul-
ture. 32 The main impact on agriculture is the phased-in reduc-
tion and eventual elimination of tariffs on all agricultural prod-
ucts. 133 However, because the FTA contains few restrictions
with respect to domestic support measures, its overall liberaliz-
ing effect is quite modest for the United States. 134 Article 3.16
does prohibit, however, export subsidies on agricultural goods
moving from one FTA partner to the other. 135 It should be noted
that this does not prohibit either Chile or the United States
from reacting to export subsidies from other countries. Under
the FTA, approximately seventy-five percent of U.S. agricultural
products will enter Chile without tariffs within four years and
100 percent will enter duty-free within twelve years. 36 In order
for the United States to gain such preferential access, Chile has
committed to phase out its price band system over the twelve-
year transition period. 137 In agreeing to its elimination, Chile
went further than required under the WTO Agreement on Agri-
culture.138
130. Id.
131. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 7. The United States was still subject to the six
percent uniform tariff while other countries that had already completed trade
agreements with Chile were exporting products without being subject to any tariff.
Id. at 5.
132. See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 127, art. 3.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 127, art. 3:16 ('Where an exporting Party con-
siders that a non-Party is exporting an agricultural good to the territory of the other
Party with the benefit of export subsidies, the importing Party shall, on written re-
quest of the exporting Party, consult with the exporting Party with a view to agree-
ing on specific measures that the importing Party may adopt to counter the effect of
such subsidized imports.").
136. See The United States and Chile Free Trade Agreement, May 2003 Fact
Sheet, at http://www.fas.usda.gov.info/factshets/ChileFTA/overall.html (last visited
Sept. 24, 2003).
137. Id. (describing the benefits that United States' farmers, ranchers, food
processors and businesses will receive with new access to Chile's new market of fif-
teen million consumers).
138. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
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IV. EVALUATION OF CHILE'S TRADE LIBERALIZATION
A. SHORT-TERM CONSEQUENCES
1. Trade Creation
In order for a free trade agreement to be successful short-
term, the agreement must lead to greater trade creation than
trade diversion and increase the economic well-being of each
signatory country. 139 In the case of the U.S.-Chile FTA, the re-
duction of trade barriers increases the imports from the other
party, not only affecting domestic production but also imports
from other countries. 140 For example, the U.S. wheat and sugar
market-while not necessarily more efficient than Chile's tradi-
tional agriculture, but highly subsidized-will enter Chile at a
lower cost than is possible for Chilean wheat and sugar farm-
ers.1 4' Chile's decision to eliminate the price band system, but
to allow export subsidies from the United States, supports the
oversupplied wheat market in the United States, thus creating
another export market.1 42 In return, Chile will increase exports
of fruit and agroindustrial products to the United States be-
cause of the comparative advantage that Chile maintains in
these sectors. 143
Trade creation is not beneficial for all sectors. Proponents
of free trade argue that trade creation is almost always eco-
nomically beneficial overall because it occurs only when the
price of the import in question is lower than the domestic cost of
producing the same good. 144 Therefore, trade creation allows
the domestic economy to obtain the good at a lower cost than
would be possible without trade. 145 Liberalization of Chile's
sugar and wheat sector has the potential for substantially re-
ducing sugar and wheat prices in Chile, which historically has
held its domestic prices above world prices through the price
band system.' 46 The trade off, critics argue, is the complete de-
139. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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struction of the domestic sector that cannot produce at such low
levels. 147 As a result, Chile potentially faces substantial rural
worker displacement through the adjustment to liberalized agri-
culture markets and production. 148 Unfortunately, trade crea-
tion does not only occur when the domestic cost of producing the
good is lower than the domestic cost of production. 149 For in-
stance, the export subsidies from the United States create the
appearance of a lower-cost good, thereby entering Chile at a
lower price. 50 In actuality, both countries produce traditional
agriculture at relatively the same cost.151 Due to the relative
size of the United States as compared to Chile, the government
is able to provide domestic support at greater levels than
Chile. 152
2. Trade Diversion
Trade diversion, the term used to describe the displacement
of imports from other countries, is less likely to be beneficial to
the importing country. As an illustration, suppose that before
the Chile-EU Association Agreement went into effect, Chile im-
ported a particular product from the United States and not the
European Union.153 However, after the Association Agreement
went into effect, because of the reduction of tariffs on the EU
goods, Chile imported the same product from the European Un-
ion and not the United States. 154 Even though the U.S. price
was lower for Chilean purchasers, the reduction of tariffs favors
the European Union product. 55 Until January 1, 2004, the
Chilean market rejected U.S. products that could easily be ob-
tained from other markets, because they were subject to the six
percent uniform import tariff.1 56 This trade diversion had dra-
matic effects on U.S. exports to Chile, 57 and therefore gave the
United States the last-minute urgency needed to complete the
U.S.-Chile FTA.158
147. See supra Part II.B.
148. See supra note 1.
149. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 75-76 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 131.
157. Olivares & Mendoza, supra note 32, at 20.
158. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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Meanwhile, Chile was feeling the same effects from the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the
United States, Mexico, and Canada. 159 Since both Chile and
Mexico maintain a comparative advantage in the fruit and vege-
table market, Mexican goods were entering the U.S. market
without being subject to tariffs. 160 Meanwhile, Chilean prod-
ucts, even though produced at a lower cost than the Mexican
goods, were subject to a small tariff.161 Thus, in the short term,
both the United States and Chile will likely benefit from trade
creation overall, but certain sectors will be devastated by the in-
evitable trade diversion that will result from the U.S.-Chile
FTA.
B. LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
Long-term effects are the most important factor for success-
ful free trade agreements but often more difficult to predict. 162
The most important long-term gains include increased competi-
tion, stimulus to investment, and more efficient use of economic
resources, while negative long-term effects include displacement
and increased government support. 163 Chilean promoters of the
U.S.-Chile FTA believe the free trade agreement will comple-
ment their economic reforms, creating a shock of productivity in
work and capital. 164 Proponents also believe the stimulus to in-
vestment will benefit all Chileans because of the privatized so-
cial security system that is based on savings and investment,
rather than taxes and spending. 165 However, trade analysts
159. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. See generally MAGDALENA
BARROS, FROM MAIZE TO MELONS: STRUGGLES AND STRATEGIES OF SMALL MEXICAN
FARMERS (2000) (describing the struggles that Mexican agriculture has undergone
since the North American Free Trade Agreement and measures being taken by
small farmers to cope with the drastic transition).
161. See supra note 111 (discussing Chile's need to open up new markets to the
fruit industry).
162. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of adjust-
ment both short and long-term).
163. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
165. Jos6 Pifiera & Aaron Lukas, Chile Takes a Bold Step Toward Freer Trade,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1999, at All, available at http://www.freetrade.org/
pubs/articles/al-1-15-99.html (describing the benefit that Chileans receive from free
trade because of their market-invested retirement funds). In 1980, Chile created
Chile's Pension Savings Account system. Id. The authors argue that the private
pension system influenced the first democratically elected government after Pino-
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must weigh the long-term effects against the social costs of ad-
justment. 166 The weaknesses in this reasoning arise from the
small number of Chileans that benefit from the privatized pen-
sion system.167 While only those in the formal economy are able
to benefit from a shock in productivity, not all formal jobs pro-
vide access to the system. 168 Moreover, since many campesinos
are not part of the formal economy, they are likely to be affected
negatively by the elimination of the price band system and like-
wise will not see any of the benefits from increased foreign in-
vestment.
1. Increased Competition
Critics argue that the price band inhibits competition and
therefore does not guarantee, in the long term, that the associ-
ated costs will be equally distributed between the producer and
the consumer. 169 This conclusion is based on historical analysis
that shows that price bands are far from being a mechanism
that stabilizes prices, but rather function as a protectionist sys-
tem, financed by consumers. 170 This is the difference between
the net benefits, meaning the overall effects for the entire coun-
try, and the distributional effects, defined as the effects that
protectionist measures have on certain sectors of the country.
This protection has cost Chilean consumers about U.S. $1.7 bil-
lion, with the greatest damage being suffered by the poorest sec-
tors.171 To illustrate this point, one need only look at the per-
centage of income that families allocate to the purchase of goods
made from wheat, sugar, and oil. 172 The poorest twenty percent
allocates almost sixteen percent of its income to the purchase of
those goods, while the richest twenty percent allocates only
3.8%.173 Despite the fact that spending on those goods in abso-
lute terms is higher in the richest quintile, as a percentage of
income the poorest are most affected by the high product price
created by the price band.174
chet to continue opening the economy. Id.
166. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 165.
168. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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Instead, critics claim that in the long term, the sugar price
band guarantees that the major beneficiary will be the only
sugar refining company in the country, IANSA, and that the
consumers will be disadvantaged. 175 Under the old price band
system, when the international price is below the fixed floor
value, the government adds a tax specifically designed to lift the
price to meet the floor level. 176 Arguably, this situation benefits
IANSA because they internally produce sugar. 177 The argument
follows that the consumers are prejudiced because instead of
paying the lower international price, they must pay the higher
internal price. 178
Both the U.S.-Chile FTA and the WTO have forced Chile to
eliminate the price band system. 179 Proponents of the elimina-
tion believe that it will increase competition against major refin-
ing companies, such as IANSA, thereby reducing the monopolis-
tic pricing of the goods for consumers. 18 0 It follows that rural
campesinos will be better off because they will not be paying as
much for basic products.1 8 l This argument fails to address two
issues. First, if competition increases, IANSA will likely be
forced out of the market or at least will have to increase its pro-
ductivity, which generally means laying off workers. 8 2 In addi-
tion, IANSA had been dedicated to contracting with small and
medium size farmers. 8 3 The decrease in IANSA's output level
will likely force the company to eliminate the contracts it has
maintained with small farmers and, instead, contract with me-
dium or large farmers who produce at a greater efficiency level
or, in the alternative, completely move into the fruit and vege-
table market.18 4
Secondly, most rural campesinos survive from their own
crop production and the crop production of other campesinos.8 5
Increased competition from the United States will decrease prof-
itability, which will likely decrease their production level to a
minimum, if anything, and force campesinos to put more money
175. See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 97-98, 137 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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into basic products.18 6 For example, if the internal prices fall as
a result of elimination of the price band system, domestic pro-
duction of sugar and wheat will fall in response to lower prices
and campesinos will be forced to purchase these products from
the market rather than surviving from their own production of
sugar and wheat.18 7 Overall, campesinos will possibly be worse
off.
2. Investment
The U.S.-Chile FTA is concerned not only with free trade,
but also with investment. Investment adds to national savings
and helps to expand productive capacity. 8 8 Price stability is
necessary in order to attract foreign direct investment in a re-
gion.18 9 The agroindustrial sector will likely attract the majority
of foreign direct investment because it is characteristic of Chile's
neoliberal policies initiated in 1974.190 The successful supply of
exports, however, requires substantially more than just changes
in market strategy in order to induce investment, even when a
comparative advantage presently exists in a market. 91 The
State has played a key role in improving capacity for the fruit
market and the agroindustrial sector in order to attract foreign
investors and has continued to do so. 192 Chile's dramatic en-
trance on the international market shows the difference the
state can play in attracting investment and stabilizing the mar-
ket. 193 The Chilean government projects that the U.S.-Chile
FTA will double the exports from Chile to the United States. 194
Given that one-third of external investments in Chile come from
the United States, the large growth in exports will provoke an
even greater injection of U.S. investment because of the acceler-
ated increase in Chile's GDP. 195 Campesinos, however, have not
received the same investment by the government and therefore
have been unable to draw foreign direct investment. 196 The in-
186. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 31, 118 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
194. Olivares & Mendoza, supra note 32, at 20.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text (discussing the large in-
vestment the Chilean government put into the export market rather than the do-
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crease in agricultural exportation lies solely within the fruit and
agroindustrial sector and does not include traditional agricul-
tural products. 197 Therefore, they will likely face a continued
loss of current domestic and foreign investors because of the
forthcoming price instability in the traditional agricultural
market. 198 Unless the state can work to promote stability in the
region, any small investors that the more viable campesinos
have today will likely put their investment in a more stable
market, such as the fruit sector.199
Unfortunately, the Chilean government does not have the
budget to support all industries while maintaining and increas-
ing involvement in the fruit and agro-industrial markets. 200 In-
stead, the government would have to use some of the resources
gained from the agricultural export market to help secure the
domestic traditional campesinos. 20 1 However, this may not be
enough given the substantial subsidies distributed to United
States farmers in the same sector. 20 2
3. Use of Resources
Chile's unique geographical location provides Chilean farm-
ers with both benefits and disadvantages. 203 Most benefits be-
long to the fruit farmers because of the specialized climate that
prevents widespread land disease and the close proximity to
Santiago and Chile's principal ports.204 The campesinos are left
with the disadvantage of low agricultural return because of the
marginalized land used for the growth of traditional agricul-
ture.205 Within the Central Valley region, the benefits will be
concentrated largely in the hands of capitalist fruit farmers and
agroindustries. 206 The fruit export boom encourages land con-
centration as large companies buy land from the campesinos.207
Academics have suggested that campesinos should switch pro-
duction to a different agricultural crop or move into the forest
mestic market).
197. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
202. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 58, 67-72 and accompanying text.
204. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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industry. 208 However, few viable alternative agricultural crops
actually exist for campesinos who wish to discontinue producing
traditional agriculture.209
A possible alternative would be to dedicate more of the Cen-
tral Valley to increase the production of fruit and move the agro-
industries to the southern regions where agriculture may no
longer be a viable alternative. Overall, this would promote an
efficient use of resources. Campesinos may be able to augment
their income by renting their land and taking off-farm employ-
ment or working in the agroindustries. Since the agroindustry
requires special resources and knowledge that the average cam-
pesino does not possess, it is unlikely that the campesinos will
be able to move into the agroindustry alone. 210 They would need
additional education in order to switch production, which they
are often unable to afford or obtain in the southern regions. 211
The government and private agroindustries are unlikely to in-
vest in the campesinos in order to support them throughout this
transition.2 12
C. FAILURES OF FREE MARKET FORCES
Proponents of the price band system and critics of the U.S.-
Chile FTA argue that the negative short and long-term effects
on traditional agriculture should outweigh the benefits on other
sectors. 213 They argue that to analyze trade only in economic
terms is not sufficient.2 14 However, even assuming that it is suf-
ficient, an economic analysis has limitations. The basic analysis
of trade creation and trade diversion does not address the eco-
nomic effects from the displacement of workers, land use, and on
the efficient producers that subsidized foreign products will
overcome. 2 15 The Chilean government, like all dominant trade
208. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. Mexican corn farmers were
also forced to find alternative employment because they could not compete with the
heavy U.S. subsidies. Hugh Dellios, 10 years later, NAFTA Harvest Falls Short: Ru-
ral Mexicans Left out ofBoom, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 2003, at 1.
209. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
215. JOHN MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE 51 (2000).
Positive trade liberalization effects may eventually relieve the poor, but in
the short/medium term the whole adjustment process may be more harmful
than helpful .... In order to benefit, the poor need to enjoy trade-induced
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policies, tends to support companies that trade, and in practice,
these are mostly larger companies, rather than small enter-
prises.216 While the wheat and sugar farmers in the south have
supported the domestic markets for many years, the govern-
ment has put resources into improving the fruit sector.217 In
turn, large-scale fruit producers bought out small basic food crop
farmers who could not afford to invest in the new crops, leaving
them with marginal land. 218 Without the price band system to
protect the traditional agriculture, 200,000 farmers will be left
without their livelihood and will be forced to move from their
land.2 19 Chile's market reform represents not only an important
economic change in Chile's agricultural sector, but also a critical
policy shift from "food security" to "food access." Politically, this
represents a drastic change in Chile's agricultural policy. In
Chile, the production of sugar, wheat and vegetable oils is not
only an economic activity, but is also a cultural one that has
strong roots in the nation's political history. Therefore, Chile's
agreement to liberalize its agricultural sector, particularly the
traditional agriculture sector, is a bold economic and political
move.
The agro-export model in Chile has had, and will continue
to have, an uneven impact on regions and farmers. 220 The boom
in fruit exports is concentrated largely in the Central Valley re-
gion.221 The employment effect of fruit production has been
positive, as it is much more labor-intensive than traditional ag-
riculture, which it has partially replaced. 222 Meanwhile, the net
employment effect on traditional agriculturists will likely be
negative, thereby accelerating displacement of workers from the
southern region. 223 Even if the campesinos were able to change
into a different agrarian sector, small farmers are not likely to
price reductions for consumer goods, as well as reduced input and in-
creased output prices which they face as producers .... [T]he poor may ex-
perience increased income risks in the short run when they switch from
producing subsistence-local goods to producing tradable goods. Given the
imperfect working of credit markets, these risks may considerably worsen
conditions for the poor.
Id.
216. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
219. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 13:2
U. S-CHILE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT
induce foreign investment or contract with the agroindustrial
sector.224 The result is 200,000 workers and their families with-
out a viable livelihood that are forced to either survive off a par-
cel of their land while selling the rest to large agroindustrial
firms or selling all of their land and migrating to the capital,
which is already home to six million habitants. 225
Displacement can exacerbate inequalities. For example,
many campesinos will be forced to leave their traditional agri-
cultural practices. 226 The loss of their practices will force them
to find alternative work either in the southern region or in the
Central Valley region. Chile's urban population will likely in-
crease over the next few years due to the inability of the cam-
pesinos to compete with U.S. imports. Meanwhile, the rural
population growth will likely remain stagnant, ending centuries
of traditional agriculture and indigenous culture in Chile. 227
Chile's essential task will be to create enough industrial jobs to
absorb dislocated rural workers while also modernizing its agri-
cultural sector with adequate technology to encourage the ad-
justment from traditional agriculture to exportable crops, where
possible.
V. STRATEGIES TO REPOSITION THE THEME OF HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT, USING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AS A
RESOURCE RATHER THAN AN OBSTACLE
The dilemma facing Chile is ultimately whether the gov-
ernment should abandon campesinos completely to market
forces or, on the contrary, whether it should launch a major de-
velopment program that would radically strengthen campesino
agriculture. 228 The latter option does not seem feasible at pre-
sent, as it would entail reviving the agrarian reform issue, re-
quiring huge transfers of economic resources to campesinos as
well as a series of domestic protection measures. 229 These pro-
campesino programs would mean abandoning much of the re-
maining neoliberal traces in government policy as well as par-
tially reversing Chile's opening to world markets. 230  Chile
224. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
227. See supra Part II.
228. See supra Part III.
229. See supra Part II.
230. See supra Part II.
20041
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
would not be willing to take such drastic measures and it would
not be good for Chile as a whole.231 The most viable choice for
the government, in order to promote at least minimal "growth
with equity", is to help ease the economic and social adjustment
in the traditional agriculture sector.232 The costs to the gov-
ernment of these adjustments will depend on structural reforms,
maintenance of the phase-out period for the price band system,
the use of exceptions as stated in the U.S.-Chile FTA, and the
availability of adjustment assistance.
The Chilean government needs to intervene in the economy
in order to rectify the limitations and inequities of the free-
market neoliberal economic system imposed by the "Chicago
Boys."2 33 As the Chilean Executive Branch and Congressional
representatives from different parties sign the free trade
agreements, there is a general understanding that financial re-
sources will be needed to strengthen the competitiveness of the
traditional agriculture sector.234 For example, when the Eco-
nomic Complementation Agreement was signed between Chile
and MERCOSUR, the Executive Branch promised a gradual in-
crease in the budget of the agricultural sector for the 1997-2001
period. 235 These monies were to be allocated mainly to areas
like development of irrigation, soil recovery, forestry develop-
ment, sanitary improvement, development of new markets, ag-
ricultural research and innovation.236 To date, campesinos have
not seen the fruits of this promise to facilitate their transition to
different activities. 237 State intervention would aid campesinos
in the transition from cereal production to a sustainable, alter-
native source of income, such as direct payments, thereby miti-
gating the harsh effects that are inexorable. 238 Without this
support, rural unemployment will inevitably increase and a sig-
nificant portion of arable land will be fallowed or put to unpro-
ductive uses. 239
The Agreement on Agriculture reformed the agricultural
231. See supra notes 105-21 and accompanying text (describing the potential
benefits to the agricultural-export market).
232. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text (discussing the government
aid to the fruit industry).
233. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (describing how the fruit sector
benefited from state aid in research and technology development).
239. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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sector in international trade.240 One key issue was the choice of
economic instruments that are decoupled from agricultural pro-
duction.241 This is necessary because of the drastic government
intervention in agriculture in most industrialized countries,
which has led to substantial increases in the output of agricul-
tural products. 242 This dramatic increase in agricultural output
has forced countries to use border measures aggressively, such
as the Chilean price band system. 243 Direct income payments
can be an alternative means of raising farm incomes in Chile, as
well as for other developed and industrial countries. 244 Direct
income payments help to transition the farmers, stabilize in-
comes and promote social assistance measures without affecting
the price of the consumer.245 These payments provide transfers
indirectly to producers, and include research and develop-
ment.246 Direct income payments are considered better than
export subsidies because they do not promote greater production
or trade diversion.247 Instead, they guarantee a minimum in-
come that may relieve poverty and facilitate mobility within ag-
riculture and to other sectors. 248
While direct payments are only a short-term solution, they
will assist campesinos throughout the price band phase-out pe-
riod. It is also important for Chile to ensure that the reduction
of tariffs for traditional agriculture follows the phase-out period
in order to minimize the social problems that will arise. More-
over, Chile must be willing to enforce the provisions that elimi-
nate export subsidies 249 against the United States while also us-
ing the safeguards250 that were established against the sharp
240. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 32 (describing the measures that the United States has
taken in order to protect their farmers).
243. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
250. See U.S.-Chile FTA, supra note 127. The safeguard measure applies to all
commodities that do not have specific tariff-rate quotas to protect against import
surges during tariff phase-out, such as the phase-out of the price band system. Id.
art. 8.1. The chapter eight safeguard measures suspends further tariff reductions
and can re-establish a rate not less than the Most Favored Nation (MFN) rate. Id.
An injured party can apply to initiate a safeguard measure, which can be main-
tained for no longer than three years or until the termination of the transition pe-
riod. Id. art. 8.2.
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increases in traditional agricultural imports that will negatively
affect the campesinos during their transitional period. Ulti-
mately, adjustment costs will likely not outweigh the benefits of
trade liberalization. Ideally, adjustment costs will be short-term
and the benefits of free trade will continue to grow and increas-
ingly benefit all sectors of Chilean society. In order for Chile to
successfully integrate its economy in the world market, the gov-
ernment must implement a strategy to enhance the competi-
tiveness of the traditional agriculture sector without postponing
conversion to other activities such as fruit and agroindustrial
production.
CONCLUSION
Chile's agrarian transformation will likely lead to overall
growth of the Chilean economy. Neoliberals claim that this
achievement is due to the market reforms introduced by the Pi-
nochet government. Unfortunately, they tend to ignore or
downplay the high social costs of this transformation, such as
the increase in rural poverty and the rising inequality among
Chilean citizens. Government policy has failed so far to reduce
the technological gap between capitalist farms and campesinos.
On the contrary, the gap has widened. While Chile continues to
deepen its integration into the world market, the size of the
farm and its level of capitalization are going to become even
more important as new economies favor larger enterprises. The
question is whether the general increase in trade will substan-
tially overtake these negative effects. Chile will have to refine
policies further at the national level in order to increase the
speed of the supply-side response so that the welfare gains from
the new liberalism can be felt by a wider section of the commu-
nity, including those most adversely affected by the free trade
agreements. Otherwise, as has already been seen through pro-
testing farmers, there is a danger of losing fragile public support
for the internationalization of Chilean agriculture and the fur-
ther integration of Chile's economy in the world market.
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